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The concept of patient insight, of a patient’s self-awareness of illness or impairment (and
related issues), plays a significant role in clinical discourse and clinical practice. But what
role does it play in the legal process, particularly when a patient’s decision-making
capacity (or “mental capacity”) is in question? We report on a survey of 412 published
judgments from the Court of Protection of England and Wales, published between 2007
and 2018. We found that the notion of patient insight played a role in 53 cases (13% of the
total). We use a variety of techniques to provide a systematic profile of these “insight
cases.” We provide a demographic profile of the patients whose insight is discussed
(focusing on gender, age and diagnosis) and a professional profile of the expert witnesses
who raise the issue of insight. We then deploy the technique of “logical geography” to map
the meaning of the term insight and the inferential patterns in which reports of patient
insight are embedded. We point out that the published insight cases never explicitly define
“insight,” and that they include no reference to structured instruments or scales for the
assessment of insight. We show that the concept of insight, as used in the Court of
Protection, is not synonymous with the concept of agreement with a diagnosis of illness;
this is at most one of a range of meanings that the concept carries. We show that, despite
the fact that the presence or absence of insight is not itself a legal criterion for mental
capacity, insightlessness does play a role, and sometimes a decisive role, in shaping
findings as regards the presence or absence of mental capacity. Finally, we assess the
extent to which expert testimony in the insight cases conforms to the insight-related
recommendation of the recent NICE Guideline on Decision-Making and Mental Capacity.
Keywords: insight, mental capacity, capacity assessment, Court of Protection (England and Wales),
conceptual geographyg September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 5603291
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In 2018, the UK government commissioned an independent
review of the Mental Health Act (England and Wales) —the so-
called Wessely Review. The final report of the review included a
call for:FrontiResearch into how the legal test of decision-making
capacity in the MCA can be translated into practice.
This should include: … the relationship with clinical
concepts such as “insight”; … [(1): 226].This paper is the first of a series of papers in which we present
the results of an extended, multipronged, multidisciplinary
research initiative addressing the relationship between insight
and decision-making capacity. The principal aim of this first
paper is descriptive. Focusing on the published judgments of the
Court of Protection (CoP) (England and Wales), we map the
current usage of the concept of patient insight in legal proceedings
that pertain to findings of decision-making (in)capacity. We assess
current usage against a recently published guidance standard.
Insight is a widely used concept in clinical discourse and
clinical practice and it also plays an important role in those
CoP proceedings where the mental capacity of the person
concerned (P) is questioned. However, the concept of patient
insight plays no explicit statutory role in England and Wales.
The term makes no appearance at all in the Mental Capacity
Act 2005 (MCA) or the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA), nor
does it feature meaningfully either in the MHA Code of
Practice 2015 (2) or in the MCA Code of Practice 2007 (3).
This statutory silence regarding the concept of insight leaves
judges with considerable leeway in determining whether and
how to incorporate considerations about patient insight into
legal proceedings.
The use of the concept of insight in CoP proceedings raises a
number of questions. How is insight defined in CoP cases? How
are insight scales and scores used in these cases as evidence to
show whether P has insight or lacks insight? Is insight used as a
binary concept? How are the concepts of insight and mental
capacity used in relation to each other? What are the socio-
demographic variables in CoP proceedings that address insight,
and how should these variations be understood?
To address these questions, we proceed as follows. We begin
(§2) by reviewing the existing academic literature on the place of
the concept of insight in legal proceedings, examining both the
literature that has focused on the role of insight in mental health
tribunals and the more limited literature that focuses on the role
of insight where decision-making capacity is the principal legal
concern. We then (§3) present the methodology we relied upon
in our survey. In §4 we provide a demographic profile of the
patients whose insight is discussed, with particular attention to
the differential patterns with respect to gender and insight. In §5
we consider the professional profiles of the expert witnesses who
discuss insight. We then turn to the inferential patterns in which
reports of patient insight are embedded, focusing first (§6) on
patterns pertaining to the meaning of the insight construct and
then (§7) on the patterns in which insight is related to mentalers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 2capacity. We conclude (§8) by considering the extent to which
expert testimony in the CoP conforms to the insight-related
recommendation of the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE) Guideline on Decision-Making and Mental
Capacity (2018) (4).
One final preliminary: This paper presupposes familiarity
with the concept of “mental capacity” (or “decision-making
capacity”) and its place in law, as also with the role of the CoP
in making legal determinations when capacity is disputed.
Readers are referred to the excellent recent article by Ruck
Keene et al. (5), for a broader survey of these matters.EXISTING RESEARCH REGARDING
INSIGHT IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
The concept and phenomenon of insight, its measurement and
its correlation with other variables, has been the subject of
academic research around the world. However, the bulk of
published research has either addressed principally clinical
issues or else has focused on the legal implications of impaired
insight in mental health tribunals and in other legal procedures
governed by Mental Health Acts. As a consequence, research on
the interface between insight and the law has tended to focus on
the role of insight and insightlessness in decisions to “section,” to
discharge from section, to resort to coercive psychiatric
interventions, etc. What has been less systematically studied
(albeit with one or two notable exceptions, of which more
below) has been the use of the concept of insight in legal
proceedings in which a person’s decision-making capacity is the
central issue.
In reviewing this literature, we begin with an overview of
studies of the role of insight in mental health tribunals and
related Mental Health Act proceedings. One pioneering work in
this area was Peay (6), which analyzed how the Mental Health
Act 1983 was put into practice in England and Wales. Peay
reported that when it came to deciding on the patient’s discharge,
Mental Health Review Tribunals placed considerable emphasis
on the question of whether the patient had insight or not and
focused particularly on the question of whether the patient
understood the need to take their medication [(6): 143]. Peay’s
finding was supported by Perkins et al., who found that, among
tribunal members, insight was the single most consistently
discussed symptom of mental illness [(7): 124].
Diesfeld (8) reached a similar set of conclusions concerning
the work of tribunals in New Zealand, while Freckelton (9) found
that tribunal decision-making in Australia regularly departed
from legislatively prescribed considerations in relation to release,
relying on substitute criteria such as “lack of insight.”
Both Diesfeld and Freckelton were critical of the role that
findings regarding insight play in tribunal proceedings. Diesfeld
complained that the ‘liberty interests of detained patients may be
compromised when tribunals utilize ill-defined, extra-legislative
criteria in determining whether to begin, or extend, psychiatric
detention’ [(8): 380]. According to Diesfield, the use of insight is
an example of such a criterion. For his part, Freckelton arguedSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
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and ill-conceived. First, it can constitute a de facto decision that
certain matters must be proved before a patient can be released;
second, it can involve reference to terms that are unhelpfully
imprecise; third, it can introduce extra-legislative considerations
which may not be justifiable’ [(9): 53].
Kress (10) argued that the time had come for the concept of
insight to have a formal place in mental health law, particularly
in the law governing coerced treatment and civil commitment,
but also in the criminal law. Kress held that “because lack of
insight negates central knowledge essential to an informed,
autonomous decision, intervention by government may well be
justified on the ground that non-autonomous behavior does not
deserve the same rights and protections as autonomous action.”
[(10): 268].
Diesfeld and McKenna (11) reported that the term insight
had been constantly in use before the mental health review
tribunals in New Zealand, but that (i) the concept of insight
was not defined, (ii) none of the decisions referred to a specific
insight assessment test and (iii) none of the decisions referred to
relevant research on interpreting insight. Diesfeld and McKenna
also noted that “in some cases, there is an implication that a
person’s insight can be located on a scale or continuum” [(11):
22-23].
Diesfeld and Sjöström (12) reviewed 25 decisions from
mental health review proceedings in the Australian state of
Victoria. They argued that the use of evidence concerning
insight was problematic for three reasons, namely (i) there was
little clarification of the meaning of insight, (ii) when insight was
used in relation to compliance, the logic was often unclear, and
(iii) there were frequent allusions to an implicit and undefined
scale of insight. The authors also argued that the concept of
insight was particularly relevant in navigating the sometimes
conflicting goals of law and medicine and in bridging the divide
between legal and clinical discourses. [(12): 86-98]
Turning to the smaller body of literature on insight and
mental capacity, one key paper is Allen, 2009 (13). Allen argued
that “[i]f the law is to recognize a role for insight, its meaning and
relationship with capacity requires more thought and greater
clarity” [(13): 169]. The most important precedent for the
present study is Case (14), which reported on use of the term
“insight” in CoP judgments from 2007 to 2015, and discussed
three cases in some detail. Our own study goes beyond Case’s in
(i) having a broader scope, (ii) distinguishing “everyday” from
“technical” uses of “insight” in CoP judgments, (iii) undertaking
a logical mapping of “insight,” and (iv) evaluating appeals to
insight against a recently published guideline.
The most recent literature concerning insight and the law has
come in response to a Supreme Court ruling in the Australian
state of Victoria (PBU & NJE v Mental Health Tribunal [2018]
VSC 564). Responding to the case, Scott and Prowacki (15)
argued that “many clinicians would not accept the proposition
that a person who has no insight into his or her serious mental
illness, has at the same time, decision-making capacity to refuse
evidence-based treatment for that serious mental illness” [(15):
7]. Invoking the findings of Trauer and Sacks (16) and Lincoln,Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 3Lüllmann and Rief (17), they also argue that ‘while poor
treatment adherence mediates the relationship between insight
and outcome, there also appears to be a direct association
between insight and outcome [(15): 5].
Responding to the same case, Freckelton (18) reiterated some
of his earlier concerns, arguing that “there is a risk that… extra-
legislative notions, such as insight and compliance, will intrude
into decision-making without legislative warrant … and it can
operationalize prejudices and be based on paternalistic myths
and irrelevancies.” [(18): 15].METHODOLOGY
In conducting our survey, we relied on the “British and Irish
Legal Information Institute” database (BAILII) for identifying
cases in which the concept of patient insight played a role in legal
proceedings in the CoP. According to BAILII, 412 CoP cases
were published in total between 2007 and 2018.
We gathered two sets of data in order to be able to provide
both the profile of P (that is, the person who is the focus of
proceedings in the insight cases) and the profile of the insight
cases themselves. Based on this approach our research focused
on P-related characteristics and procedure-related factors. Our P-
related characteristics were the following:
i. Gender of P;
ii. Age of P at the time of the judgment;
iii. Diagnosis of P.
We had planned to gather data concerning national origin of
P, but this was too infrequently reported to make for a
meaningful and reliable data set.
We collected data on procedure-related factors including
the following:
i. List of mentions of insight;
ii. Object of insight (i.e., insight into what?);
iii. Expert(s) involved;
iv. Who mentioned insight;
v. Link between insight and related concepts including
diagnosis and mental capacity.
Interrogating the BAILII database for occurrences of the
search-term “insight” in judgments of the CoP (England and
Wales) between 2007 and 2018, we found 89 cases and a total of
208 uses of the term.
However not all of these ‘hits’ were relevant to our aims. The
term “insight” has an ordinary use in everyday discourse in
addition to its technical or quasi-technical meaning in the
discourse surrounding health and care. For example, one judge
expressed his appreciation for two expert witnesses in the
following terms:Both Mr Entwistle and Mr Rees prepared detailed
written submissions on the issues for each hearing. I
am extremely grateful to both of them for the clarity ofSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
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Frontitheir submissions and the insight which each has
brought to the issues. (The Public Guardian v DA &
Ors [2018] EWCOP 26, para 16)In our preliminary sift of the data set, we accordingly drew a
distinction between relevant (i.e., technical/quasi-technical) and
irrelevant (i.e., everyday) occurrences of the word “insight.”
Occurrences were deemed to be relevant, for example, if
insight into health condition, insight into mental illness and/or
impairment, insight into care needs, insight into consequences,
insight into the need for medication, insight into risk, or insight
into the need for treatment was mentioned. However, when
insight was used in relation to experts in order to emphasize, for
example, that their contribution was insightful, or when P’s
insight into other matters were the focus, we excluded those
occurrences from our analysis.
Of the 208 occurrences of the term “insight” in the cases that
we surveyed, we sifted out 62 instances (30%) as irrelevant,
leaving a total of 146 instances (70%) as relevant. 60% of the
cases in which the word “insight” occurred survived this
preliminary sifting—a total of 53 cases. In the other 40% (36
cases), all uses of “insight” were deemed irrelevant to our survey.
The 53 relevant cases included cases in which insight was used
both in a relevant and in a non-relevant way. These 53 cases
constituted 12.86% of the initial set of 412 published CoP cases.
In the balance of our analysis we refer to these 53 cases as “the
CoP Insight Cases,” or simply “the Insight Cases.”DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF PERSONS
CONCERNED
So who are the people whose insight is discussed in the CoP? In
this section we provide a demographic profile. As we have seen,
our survey yielded 53 Insight Cases, but in fact there were 56
individuals discussed. This was because three of the cases
combined discussions of more than one individual. To provide
context for our demographic profile, we used the findings ofers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 4Series et al. (19) which reported on an audit of CoP applications,
and used BAILII to generate a random sample (n=100) from the
412 published cases that fell within the review period, excluding
judgments which involved more than one P.
Age
Figure 1 provides a profile of the age of the persons who were the
focus of proceedings in the CoP Insight Cases, alongside
comparison data showing the age profile from our random
sample from all published CoP judgments. As can be seen
there, the sample from the full set of published CoP judgments
skews older, with high representation from Ps aged 80 and above.
The distribution of age in the Insight Cases shows two peaks, one
among those under 30 (29% of the total) and a second over 80
(19% of the total).
Gender
Series et al. (19) reported that “in most areas there was little
evidence of an effect of gender on the kinds of applications
received by the CoP” [(19): 38-39]. In their survey of
applications, they found 118 men and 114 women [(19): 42].
We were therefore surprised to find that the gender split in the
CoP Insight Cases showed a dramatic gender asymmetry, with
roughly two women for every man at the focus of the
proceedings. Otherwise put: almost two-thirds of the CoP
Insight Cases involve women. In cases involving persons either
under 40 or between 60 and 90, the gender split was nearly 3:1.
Figure 2 shows the gender split by age-group.
Care must be exercised in interpreting these findings. The
overall number of cases we surveyed was not large (53 cases; 56
persons), and when divided by age group the numbers are even
smaller. So no statistically significant information can be
garnered from this observation. Moreover, it is important to
recognize that the baseline data from Series et al. pertained to
applications to Court. By contrast, our survey focused on
published judgments of the Court. It is possible that the process
whereby judgments are selected for publication itself introduces
a gender bias. Accordingly we decided to check all 412 publishedFIGURE 1 | Age of P in Court of Protection (CoP) Insight Cases (n = 56) and in a random sample of all published CoP cases (n = 100); 2007–2018.September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
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determine the gender of the person who was the focus of
proceedings. Note that this total includes both the CoP Insight
Cases and cases that make no relevant mention of insight. Once
again we were surprised: we found that the gender divide in the
published CoP judgments was also approximately 2:1 (i.e., two
women for every man). A number of experts with whom we have
consulted have speculated about the explanation for this gender
asymmetry in the published cases. We resist the temptation to
enter into such speculation here. The important point for our
purposes is that the gender divide in the CoP Insight Cases
mirrors the gender divide in the larger pool of published CoP
cases from which they are drawn.
Diagnosis/Disability
Series et al. (19) provided data on the range of diagnoses and
disabilities of P recorded as a stated cause of incapacity. Our
research produced data on P’s diagnoses and impairments as
reported both (a) in a sampling of all published CoP judgments,
and (b) in the COP Insight Cases. The notable variation across
these three datasets pertains to the prevalence of the diagnosis of
schizophrenia, which appears in one-fifth of the CoP Insight
Cases, but in only 5% of our random sample of all published CoPFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 5cases, and in only 9% of the applications surveyed by Series et al.
See Figure 3.
Gender, Diagnosis, Insight
At the intersection of gender, diagnosis, and insight, we found at
least asmanywomenasmen in all but one categoryofdiagnosis. See
Figure 4. Notice that there were only twomenwith the diagnosis of
schizophrenia whose insight was discussed in the CoP Insight
Cases, while we find 9 women with the same diagnosis whose
insight was discussed. We would re-emphasize, however, that the
absolute numbers at this level of analysis are tiny, and the
background gender balance in the published CoP judgments
must be taken into account.PROFESSIONAL PROFILE OF EXPERT
WITNESSES
Paula Case (14) pointed out in her study that “[w]hilst the law
asserts the upper hand in the assessment of mental capacity for
persons who come before the CoP, it is the discipline of
psychiatry, which dominates expert witness testimony in theseFIGURE 3 | Prevalence of Diagnosis. The first column shows the prevalence of the most commonly mentioned diagnoses in applications to the Court of Protection
(CoP) as reported in Series et al. [(19):43]. The second column shows the prevalence of these diagnoses in our random sample of 100 published CoP judgments.
The third column shows the prevalence of these diagnoses (as percentages and as absolute values) among the 56 persons who were the focus of proceedings in
the CoP Insight Cases.FIGURE 2 | Age groups divide by gender in Court of Protection (CoP) insight cases between 2007 and 2018 (n = 56).September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
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of the Insight Cases. We found the following:
i. Reports of insight and lack of insight were most frequently
provided by psychiatrists. See Figure 5. 38.4% of the total
relevant usages of insight is linked to this expertise. Social
workers used insight in a relevant way in 6.8% of the total
usages. Psychologists and neuropsychologists mentioned
insight in 4.8%, while GPs in 4.1% of the total relevant
usages of insight.
ii. Psychiatrists were the experts who commented on insight most
frequently in the insight cases. Out of the 53 cases where insight
was mentioned in a relevant way, psychiatrists and
neuropsychiatrists commented on insight in 28 cases, which
represent 52.8% of the total. Social workers mentioned insight
in 8 cases (15.1%), psychologists and neuropsychologists in five
cases (9.4%) and GPs in two cases (3.8%).
iii. Psychiatrists were the most involved experts in insight cases
regardless of whether they commented on insight or not.
Psychiatrists were involved in 75.5%, social workers in
32.1%, and psychologists in 17% of the Insight Cases. For
comparison, in our sampling of all published CoP
judgments, testimony from psychiatrists was reported inFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 6only 34% of the judgments; social workers in 24% and
psychologists in 10%.
In sum, our data clearly shows that the leading expertise used
in insight-related CoP cases was psychiatry.Moreover, psychiatric
experts were more than twice as likely to be involved in cases that
address insight than they are in other CoP proceedings.CONCEPTUAL GEOGRAPHY (I): THE
MEANING OF “INSIGHT”
Studies of the use of the concept of insight in mental health
tribunals have found that the term is often left undefined and
poorly clarified [(11): 22, (11): 86-98]. Surveys of tribunal
judgments in New Zealand and Australia found no tribunal
judgments that relied on the results of any specific scale or test
for the measurement of insight [(11): 22). Furthermore, while
tribunal judgments included frequent references to insight as a
scalar phenomenon, there was no evidence of reliance on any
formal instrument for rating or quantifying degrees of insight
[(11): 22, (11): 86-98].FIGURE 5 | Mentions of insight by experts in Court of Protection (CoP) Insight Cases (most represented disciplines); 2007–2018.FIGURE 4 | Diagnosis divide by gender in Court of Protection (CoP) Insight Cases between 2007 and 2018 (n = 56).September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
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rulings. Both expert witnesses and judges regularly use the concept
of insight, but we searched in vain for any explicit definition or
clarification of what was meant by the concept. We also found no
examples of expert witnesses or judges availing themselves of
insight tests or insight scales for the quantification of insight.
So what does “insight” mean in the CoP? In the absence of
any clear definitions, we adopted a different approach for
identifying and elaborating the specific meaning or meanings
of the term as it is currently used in CoP proceedings. Following
Fulford (20) we adopted a strategy of conceptual geography. On
this method, indebted to Ryle (21) and Wittgenstein’s
philosophical approach to language, one discloses the meaning
or meanings of a technical term by mapping recurrent patterns of
usage employed by speakers, particularly expert speakers. In this
section and the one that follows we present the results of our
exercise in semantic mapping. In this section we focus on
patterns of usage that help identify what the term insight
means in CoP proceedings. In the following section we focus
on patterns of usage that bear on the inferential significance of
findings of insight as regards findings of mental (in)capacity.
As we have indicated, the concepts of insight or
insightlessness are nowhere defined in the published cases of
the CoP. But we mapped five recurrent patterns of usage that
implicitly disclosed elements of the meaning of these terms.
These patterns sometimes occur independently of one another;
in other cases (and even in some individual sentences), these
different patterns are intertwined in a variety of ways. In what
follows we name and briefly explain each of these five patterns,
followed in each case by examples from the surveyed case law;
emphasis in bold print is added throughout. In presenting these
patterns we adopt a distinctive use of the double colon (::) to
make clear that we are not here listing formal definitions. As we
use it here, A :: B means A is elaborated in terms of B.
Pattern 1
P Lacks Insight :: P Does Not Believe/Accept/Agree That S/He Has
a (Mental Health) Problem.
Much of the published discussion of impaired insight focuses
on the phenomenon in which a patient disputes their diagnosis –
typically where the diagnosis is schizophrenia. This usage was
well represented in the surveyed cases. Examples:FrontiDr O has been JB’s community psychiatrist since
October 2013. She has seen her three times: October,
January and 12 February. She advises that JB lacks
insight into her mental state and does not believe
that she has a mental illness. This is not uncommon
with schizophrenia. (Heart of England NHS
Foundation Trust v JB [2014] EWCOP 342, para 30)
The question of capacity is central to the jurisdiction
of this court and I was satisfied that, having considered
all the documents, there should be an assessment by an
independent expert. Dr Hugh Series was instructed
and his report is dated 27 January 2017. His opinion is
that, on the balance of probability SL is suffering fromers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 7paranoid schizophrenia which is a recognized mental
disorder. At paragraph 7.1.5 he says that, “…
schizophrenia is a condition which interferes with
the process of thought, and it can undermine a
person’s ability to reason and to weigh things up
appropriately. It is common for a person to lack
insight into his condition and not accept that
there is anything wrong. I found that SL did not
agree that she had schizophrenia; this is also reported
many times in the papers in the bundle.” (SL, Re
[2017] EWCOP 5, para 7.)Pattern 2
P Lacks Insight:: P Does Not Comprehend/Understand His/Her
(Mental Health) Problem.
The second pattern of usage might be considered a close
variant on the first. But rather than elaborating insight in terms
of believing or accepting (as in the first pattern), the elaboration
here concerns comprehending or understanding a problem or
impairment. In this pattern, the problem in question was
typically something other than a psychotic disorder. Examples:I accept the expert evidence of both Doctor Ahmed
and Doctor Davis. In particular, it is abundantly clear,
given the cognitive deterioration which DM has
sustained from chronic abuse of alcohol, that DM
has no insight or comprehension as regards his
alcohol problem, nor as to his proven inability to
care adequately for himself. (DM v Y City Council
[2017] EWCOP 13, para 16)
It was common ground that C lacked capacity to
conduct the litigation and capacity to make decisions
as to her health and social care needs, just as it was
common ground that A and C each lacked capacity to
make decisions about being locked in her bedroom at
night. (Indeed, it is plain that they have only very
limited understanding of or insight into their
disabilities.) I made interim declarations to that
effect… (A Local Authority v A (A Child)& Anor
[2010] EWCOP 978, para 35)Pattern 3
P Lacks Insight :: P Does Not Recognize/Understand Risk(s).
Although published discussions and debates about insight
often focus on the awareness of illness, we found that one of the
most common patterns of usage in the surveyed cases pertained
not directly to awareness of diagnosis but specifically to the
recognition or understanding of risk. Examples:She was assessed as having “very limited insight” as to
why there are significant concerns about her behavior
and the risks she was placing herself in; she also “had
limited understanding of the impact which her autism
spectrum disorder has on her ability to estimate risksSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
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Frontiand make decisions for herself which are not going to
leave her in a dangerous position.” (Z & Ors, Re [2016]
EWCOP 4, para 40)
D concluded: “on reassessment, PH appears to have
mentally deteriorated. At the time of assessment he
was fixated on the notion of returning to R’s property
but had limited insight into the practicalities of this
idea, and I was unable to negotiate and reason with
him. He did not appear to understand the information
that we were discussing, nor was he processing the
information in a manner that allowed for the decision-
making process to be considered. PH appeared to
have no insight into the risks that would be present in
the community and he was unable to discuss with me
the options for ensuring that the risks were
manageable and positive.” (PH v A Local Authority
[2011] EWCOP 1704, para 48)Pattern 4
P Lacks Insight :: P Does Not Recognize/Understand Care/
Support Needs.
In a related set of cases, the “object” of insight or impaired
insight pertained specifically to the person’s need for care and
support. In some (but not all) instances this pattern was closely
associated with perceptions about the value of medication (see
Pattern 5). Examples:He is at risk of self neglect because he lacks insight
into his care needs and the need to maintain his
medication. (Bournemouth Borough Council v PS &
Anor [2015] EWCOP 39, para 10)
“Due to [Miss V]’s lack of insight, she is unable to
understand her vulnerability when out in the
community, particularly with regards to strangers
approaching her and possibly asking her to get into a
car, or the fact that she may get lost and be unable to
find her way back. [Miss V] showed no understanding
of the support that she needs for personal safety.” (The
Hospital Trust v V & Ors [2017] EWCOP 20, para 42)Pattern 5
P Lacks Insight :: P Fails to Recognize the Value of Treatment.
In some academic discussions, one key factor in insight is held
to be adherence with treatment. In our survey, we found few
cases where the concept of insight was elaborated directly in
terms of treatment-adherence; what was more common was a
pattern of usage linking insight specifically with the recognition
of the need or value of treatment. Examples:In relation to capacity to decide where to live Dr Killaspy
identified the following as relevant information[:]
(i). her lack of insight into her mental health condition
and the connection between taking medication anders in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 8remaining well. (London Borough of Islington v QR
[2014] EWCOP 26, para 43)
KD [exhibited] persistent lack of insight into nature of
her mental disorder and the importance for her health
in complying with antipsychotic medication. (BHCC v
KD [2016] EWCOP B2, para 16)It should be clear from the foregoing that the terms “insight”
and “insightlessness” can be used in a variety of ways. Moreover,
as it is used in the Court of Protection, the concept of insight is
demonstrably not synonymous with the concept of acceptance of
or agreement with a diagnosis of illness. As we have seen, the
concept has a significantly broader range of application. We
return to the significance of this ambiguity for good practice in
§8, below. First, however, we extend our exercise in conceptual
geography to consider the matter of inferential significance.CONCEPTUAL GEOGRAPHY (II):
INFERENTIAL PATTERNS REGARDING
INSIGHT AND CAPACITY
One of our principal aims in conducting the case law survey was
to identify the role that claims about patient insight play in
expert testimony and judicial rulings in the CoP. We were
particularly interested in the conclusions that were drawn from
evidence of insightlessness, and in the ways in which attributions
of insight or insightlessness were used to support claims about
decision-making capacity or incapacity. We identified eight main
patterns in which these concepts occurred; emphasis in bold
print is added throughout.Pattern 6
Bare/Atomic
In many cases, claims that a patient lacked insight were reported
as “bare facts”—i.e., without evidence to support the claim of
insightlessness and without any explicit indication of conclusions
from that claim. In a number of these cases, claims about a
patient’s insight appeared as part of a list of features of the
patient’s clinical presentation. Examples:I have also noted how a loss of insight appears to be a
prominent feature of her mental state when she is
unwell. (SAD & Anor v SED [2017] EWCOP 3,
para. 14.)
Dr. F has had the chance to assess DD on three
separate occasions since I delivered that judgment
on 4 July 2014. His further assessments (report 15
August 2014 and 6 January 2015) have yielded a
number of additional insights, namely that DD
displays poor reciprocal social interventions, “poor
insight into her social difficulties”; “stereotyped
idiosyncratic us [sic.] of words and phrases” with
“clear abnormalities in two way conversations….”September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
Gurbai et al. Insight Under Scrutiny
Fronti(The Mental Health Trust & Ors v DD & Anor [2015]
EWCOP 4; para 55.)Pattern 7
Unspecified
In other cases a claim regarding insightlessness appeared alongside
a claim about incapacity, but without any indication as to how, if
at all, the evidence about patient insight was taken to relate to the
conclusions drawn about the patient’s capacity. Examples:CA did not have capacity or insight about what was
going to happen, or likely to happen… (Re CA (Natural
Delivery or Caesarean Section) [2016] EWCOP 51,
para 26.)
On 15 June 2018, DrM, a consultant psychiatrist, reported
that, in her view, SJ had no insight. He was unable to
understand or believe information given to him. He was
unable to weigh up the pros and cons of treatment. In her
view, he lacked capacity to make decisions regarding his
health. (SJ, Re [2018] EWCOP 28; para 18.)
FT has had dementia since 2012. According Dr V R
Badrakalimuthu, a consultant psychiatrist at Parklands
Hospital, Basingstoke: “FT has written cheques whilst
having no understanding of transactions through his
bank account. … He also has limited insight into his
cognitive impairment and lacks capacity regarding
health and welfare.” FT, Re [2015] EWCOP 49, para 8Pattern 8
Interchangeability
In one case (two instances), the concepts of capacity and insight
were used in a way that suggested that they were functionally
equivalent to one another:MB exhibits more complete decision making
capacity/insight when away from NB. (…) It seems
to me that this report is evidence of MB’s wishes and
feelings in respect of rehabilitation placement being
more amenable to suggestion when away from NB, but
not of his decision-making capacity/insight being
any more complete (London Borough of Brent v NB
[2017] EWCOP 34; para 84).Pattern 9
Fifth Wheel
In some cases, insightlessness was explicitly included among the
grounds for a finding of incapacity, but the other enumerated
grounds were sufficient on their own to warrant the same
conclusion, with or without the claim about insightlessness. Examples:The factors that have driven them [specialist registrar and
consultant psychiatrist] to that [C lacks capacity to
conduct the proceedings and to make decisions abouters in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 9her obstetric care, including whether to undergo a
caesarean section] conclusion are[:]
1. C has no insight into her current condition or her
need for treatment.
2. Her manic symptoms mean she is unable to
concentrate for sufficient periods of time to receive
all the information relevant to the decisions to
be made.
3. If she went into labor the position would be
dynamic and require decisions to be made in an ever
changing situation, possibly at short notice.
4. Her symptoms prevent her being able to manage these
situations as she has limited understanding, limited
retention and lacks the ability to weigh the information
she has received or use it to make the relevant decisions.
(NHS Trusts v C (Medical Treatment and Reporting
Restrictions Order) (1) [2016] EWCOP 17, para 55)
Dr Andrews provided evidence from his conversations
with M during his examination on 28 March to
support his conclusions that she lacked capacity in
these six areas[:]
1. Deciding on care arrangements – M repeatedly
indicated that she was ‘finished with medication at
hospital’ and that, if given the choice, would leave. She
said she required no support and was now ready to
resume independent life. Dr Andrews found that her
insight into her mental health needs remained
significantly impaired. She was unable to attend to,
recall or weigh up basic information specific to the role
and effects of her new medication… (AB v HT & Ors
[2018] EWCOP 2, para 35)Pattern 10
Scope-Delimited Direct Inference
In some cases, insight was held to be essential to capacity for
some particular kind of decision, so that a lack of capacity
for such a decision could be inferred directly from lack of
insight. Examples:It was decided that he lacked capacity to make decisions
about his future residence because of his lack of insight
into his care needs… (RD & Ors (Duties and Powers of
Relevant Person’s Representatives and Section 39D
IMCAS) (Rev 1) [2016] EWCOP 49, para 20)
Her health and functioning have been maximized but
she still does not have capacity to make decisions
which require insight into her illness (London
Borough of Islington v QR [2014] EWCOP 26,
para 47).
She felt Z over-estimates her ability to keep herself
safe, and underestimates her own vulnerability; that inSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
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indicated that she would be looking for Z to develop
and display insight, that she is not putting herself in
risky situations and is understanding of other people’s
motives… (Z & Ors, Re [2016] EWCOP 4, para 49)Pattern 11
Rejection of Direct Inference
In at least one case (two instances), a direct inference from lack of
insight to lack of capacity was rejected:[T]here is no necessary correlation between a lack of
insight into schizophrenia and incapacity to decide
about surgery [an amputation of her right leg]…
(Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust v JB
[2014] EWCOP 342, para 41)
My conclusion is that JB undoubtedly has a
disturbance in the functioning of her mind in the
form of paranoid schizophrenia (as to which she lacks
insight), but that it has not been established that she
thereby lacks the capacity to make a decision about
surgery for herself. On the contrary, the evidence
establishes that she does have capacity to decide
whether to undergo an amputation of whatever kind.
(Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust v JB [2014]
EWCOP 342, para 43)Pattern 12
Indirect Inference
In these cases, lack of insight is invoked as a factor that explains the
absence of one or more of the four so-called statutory abilities (to
understand, retain, use/weigh, communicate); the absence of the
statutory abilities (rather than the absence of insight per se) is then
used to justify the conclusion that capacity is absent. Examples:According to Dr C, he was not orientated in time,
although he was to place and person, and his short
term memory was significantly impaired. Dr C
concluded that PH was not able to weigh up the
information concerning his future residence due to
poor insight into his physical and mental health
condition adding to the limitation of his own
capabilities and what his care needs entail. Dr C
observes: “this lack of insight and understanding of
limitations prevented him from balancing the pros
and cons remaining at Y Court.” (PH v A Local
Authority [2011] EWCOP 1704, para 44.)
“Due to [Miss V]’s lack of insight, she is unable to
understand her vulnerability when out in the
community, particularly with regards to strangers
approaching her and possibly asking her to get into
a car, or the fact that she may get lost and be unable to
find her way back. [Miss V] showed no understandingers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 10of the support that she needs for personal safety.” (The
Hospital Trust v V & Ors [2017] EWCOP 20, para 42.)
When Dr P asked GW about her road safety, she was
adamant that she never walked in the road. She said that
her road sense was excellent. Dr P concluded that it was
quite clear that GW was “quite insightless” into her lack
of road safety and awareness. He concluded that she was
unable to understand or weigh up key information
relevant to the decision as to whether she should go out
of the unit unescorted because she does not understand
the risk that her lack of road safety poses. (GW v A Local
Authority & Anor [2014] EWCOP 20, para 26.)Pattern 13
Causal Chain
In these cases, which overlap with Pattern 12, insightlessness is
explicitly identified as part of a causal chain that starts with a
diagnosed disorder. Insightlessness is characterized as an effect of
the disorder, with incapacity then characterized as an effect of
insightlessness. Example:In relation to those areas where he is of the opinion that
SL lacks capacity, he commented that she simply did not
accept the information about her previous condition
namely that she had arrived at a state of self-neglect,
poor nutrition and weight loss which probably
contributed to the development of the ulcers. He
considered that the refusal to accept the information
was a result of her lack of insight into her illness
[paranoid schizophrenia], which is itself a result of the
illness [8.1.2]. The natural result of her refusal to accept
this informationmeans that she cannot use or weigh it,
although she can retain it because she has no memory
problem as such. (SL, Re [2017] EWCOP 5, para 9).PLAYING NICE?
There is relatively little formal guidance about the use of evidence
concerning insight in the legal assessment of decision-making
capacity under the MCA standard. The original MCA Code of
Practice, for example, is notably silent on the topic. (In the
academic literature, Case 2016 proposes some broad guidance,
mainly in the form of a catalog of pitfalls to be avoided.) But in its
recently published Guidelines on Decision-Making and Mental
Capacity (4), the National Institute of Health and Care
Excellence (NICE) directed practitioners as follows:Practitioners should be aware that a person may have
decision-making capacity even if they are described as
lacking “insight” into their condition. Capacity and
insight are 2 distinct concepts. If a practitioner believes
a person’s insight/lack of insight is relevant to their
assessment of the person’s capacity, they must clearly
record what they mean by insight/lack of insight inSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
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affect the person’s capacity. (National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence, 2018: 25. Para 1.4.24)It is important to note that this guidance from NICE was
published on 3 October, 2018. Recall that our survey focuses on
published CoP judgments from 2007 to 2018; the most recent
judgment from our pool of CoP Insight Cases was published on 5
October, 2018. So the judgments we surveyed were prepared and
published without the benefit of the NICE guidance. That
guidance nonetheless provides a useful standard against which
these earlier published judgments can be assessed.
NICE Guideline 1.4.24 effectively includes four discrete pieces
of guidance. Specifically, it enjoins practitioners:
• to be alive to the possibility that a person might have decision-
making capacity despite being described as lacking insight;
• to be cognizant of the conceptual distinction between insight
and capacity;
• to be clear about what they mean by insight or lack of insight;
and
• to be clear about how they believe insight or lack of insight
affects a person’s capacity.
We were unable to identify any single case among those we
surveyed in which all four of these injunctions were squarely
satisfied. In the main this was because the concept of insight was
so regularly used without adequate specification as to its meaning.
Our survey also makes clear just how serious a problem this can
present. As we have seen, even in the relatively homogenous and
formalized discourse of the Court of Protection, the concepts of
insight and insightlessness do not have a unitary meaning. A
description of P as insightless might mean that P disputes her
diagnosis (Pattern 1), or that she does not understand her
impairment (Pattern 2); it might mean that she does not
recognize risks (Pattern 3) or care/support needs (Pattern 4) or
the value of treatment (Pattern 5). And these are by no means the
only possibilities. Readers of the rulings are often left guessing as
to the meaning of the term, particularly when insightlessness is
reported as a ‘bare fact’ (Pattern 6).
As regards the other three NICE injunctions, the record in the
COP Insight Cases was mixed. In at least one case the conceptual
distinction between insight and capacity seemed to be elided
altogether (Pattern 8), but there were also cases which recognized
the distinction (e.g., Pattern 12) and one case explicitly noted the
possibility of capacity despite insightlessness (Pattern 11), as
required by the first injunction.
What about the final NICE injunction—the requirement to be
clear about how insight or insightlessness is thought to bear on
the question of capacity? This was the point on which we found
the broadest spectrum of practice. As we have seen, there were
cases where a finding of insightlessness was presented alongside
testimony regarding a lack of capacity, but without any comment
on the relation between these two claims (Patterns 7 and 8). Iners in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 11other cases (Patterns 12 and 13), the link between evidence of
insight and evidence of capacity was made explicit.LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As we noted at the outset, this paper is intended as the first in a
series in which we seek to answer the call of the Wessely Review
for more systematic research on the relationship between insight
and decision-making capacity. The principal limitations of the
present survey derive from its scope and its methodology.
As regards scope, we have confined our attention here to
formal judgments of the Court of Protection in England and
Wales; even there we have been able to survey only that subset of
cases that have been recorded and made publicly available. This
is a small subset of the much larger number of cases (both inside
and outside the courtroom) in which findings of insight and
insightlessness are brought to bear on questions of capacity. We
cannot assume that the subset is representative. Moreover, our
survey has been based only on the published judgments
themselves, including those excerpts from expert testimony
that the judges have seen fit to record; we have not had direct
access to the expert reports themselves. In future work we will
therefore supplement the present survey with material drawn
from other sources, both in the UK and internationally.
As regards methodology, our approach here has been almost
entirely descriptive. We sought to create a ‘snapshot’ of the
current use of evidence concerning insight in the Court of
Protection; we have not sought to determine whether that
usage is correct. The closest we have come to assessment was
in considering the extent to which current CoP usage conforms
to NICE Guideline 1.4.24. But we have not sought to assess the
adequacy of the NICE Guideline itself. In future work we will
need to address the normative question more squarely. On that
basis we plan to propose a more fine-grained set of evidence-
based guidelines as to whether and how evidence concerning
insight and insightlessness should be gathered, presented and
adjudicated in the assessment of mental capacity
A final limitation of the present survey pertains to its focus on
matters of mental capacity. As we have seen, evidence regarding
impaired insight is regularly used in determining whether a
person has or lacks mental capacity for a decision that needs
to be made. By this legal pathway, insightlessness can become a
determinant (and sometimes a decisive determinant) of the
scope of a person’s legal capacity and rights. But there is a
second legal pathway in which evidence of insightlessness can
also be relevant, viz., in decisions about whether to detain a
patient for treatment under a Mental Health Act section. In
future work we will adapt the method of ‘conceptual geography’
that we have used here in examining the ways in which evidence
of insight is used on this second legal pathway, particularly in the
context of juridico-clinical decision-making on psychiatric
ward rounds.September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560329
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